SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SUMMARY

There are more than four times as many Soviet officials stationed in the United States as there are American officials stationed in the Soviet Union. This imbalance results largely from two factors: the presence of the United Nations in New York and the Soviet preference for using their own nationals for service functions at diplomatic and consular establishments. Apart from permanent staffs, the Soviets have many more seamen visiting United States ports than we have seamen visiting the Soviet Union, but this inequality is overbalanced by the fact that some 70,000 American tourists visit the Soviet Union each year as compared with about 1,000 Soviet citizens who come here as tourists.

Wherever possible, we apply reciprocity in our dealings with the Soviet Union. In the years to come, we will continue to insist upon this where it is feasible, and on staff ceilings of reasonable size where it is not. As in the past, we will cooperate closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in monitoring Soviet activities in this country, and support remedial action, such as arresting or declaring individuals persona non grata when circumstances warrant. We recognize that the presence of hundreds of Soviet citizens accomplishing various functions for the Soviet Government within our borders presents a security threat to us, and we are doing and shall continue to do what is needed to minimize that threat. However, we also recognize that as the number of bilateral subjects on which we and the Soviets are in contact increases, we must expect an increase in the Soviet presence in the United States corresponding to an increase in the number of American officials, visitors, and commercial representatives in the Soviet Union.

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GROUP 1
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TOP SECRET
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We have considered the Soviet presence in the United States and Soviet intelligence operations against the United States in light of the recent revelations about Soviet activities in the United Kingdom and Belgium, as well as in the context of improving US-Soviet relations and the forthcoming trip of the President to the Soviet Union. The British action was taken in part on the basis of a high-level KGB defection and against the background of a sharp increase of Soviet presence in Britain to the point where it far exceeded the Soviet presence for bilateral purposes in any Western country; it also reflected British dissatisfaction with a disappointing level of Soviet-British trade, which had been the ostensible reason for much of the Soviet personnel build-up in the United Kingdom.

The Belgian action was taken on the basis of the revelations of a high-level GRU defector who had been posted in Belgium.

Approximately two-thirds of the Soviet personnel in the United States and almost two-thirds of those who are known or suspected intelligence personnel are in New York. Ninety percent of these are employees of the United Nations Secretariat or of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Our ability to control Soviet presence in this category is limited, but there are certain steps we can take, which will be discussed later.

Turning to the main components of this presence, we can make the following observations:
a. Soviet Embassy, Washington

The Soviet Embassy in Washington, including the advance party of Soviet representatives in San Francisco, numbers 103 diplomatic employees and 77 staff and service employees. Our Embassy in Moscow and in Leningrad numbers 57 diplomatic and 57 staff personnel. Neither total includes dependents or working wives. The discrepancy between the 180 Soviets and 114 Americans in the Soviet Union is largely explained by the fact that the Soviets employ their own nationals for service functions, while we hire between 90-100 Soviet local employees in Moscow to perform these functions. We also hire 20-30 United States or third-country-national service personnel who are not included in the above total for Americans.

We have declared a number of Soviet diplomats persona non grata over the years. In 1970 we refused a visa to a Soviet Counselor who had been involved in recruitment activity during a previous tour in the United States. The threat of persona non grata action and the careful screening of new appointments to the Soviet Embassy remain the best, if not totally satisfactory, means we have of limiting Soviet Embassy intelligence personnel in Washington. More severe measures would undoubtedly result in counteractions against our staff in the Soviet Union.

b. Leningrad and San Francisco Consulates General

We have been aware from the outset of the need to prevent the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco from becoming the center of a major West Coast intelligence operation. The Soviets now have six officers in San Francisco while there are four American officials and one service employee in Leningrad. We have refused Soviet requests to increase their San Francisco staff at a time when they outnumber our Leningrad advance party.
For the future, when the Consulates General will formally open, we have recommended a formula that would require general parity on officer and staff personnel and permit the Soviets to bring in their own nationals for service personnel in numbers not to exceed fifty percent of their combined officer and staff personnel. Working wives would not be counted either for purposes of parity or as a basis for the combined staff figure. We now plan a staff of twenty-one in Leningrad. Under the suggested formula the Soviets would be limited in San Francisco to twenty-one officers and staff and eleven service personnel. We believe that this formula meets our needs, both in respect to Leningrad staffing and in keeping the Soviet presence in San Francisco to a manageable level.

c. **Soviet Mission to the United Nations**

About 175 officials, not counting working wives, work for the Soviet, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Missions to the United Nations. Over the years we have expelled seven Mission personnel under the provisions of Section 13(b) of the Headquarters Agreement, concerning abuse of the privileges of residence. We have also refused re-entry visas to eight persons who, while previously in the United States, had engaged in activities falling under Section 13(b). There is no formal control over the size of the Soviet United Nations Mission which is covered by the Headquarters Agreement. However, we believe that we could successfully oppose any undue further enlargement in the size of the Mission.

d. **Soviet Employees at the UN Secretariat**

The Soviets now have 202 employees at the UN Secretariat and five more on UN committees (of a total of about 3,500 non-American employees). They do not now have their full share of UN employees, according to the formula used by the UN in distributing jobs by nationalities. Their full share would be around 260. Unlike other Soviet personnel in the United States, these persons are not
now under travel restrictions and may travel freely about the country. The possibility of imposing a travel notification requirement upon them is being studied by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), which is composed of members of State, Justice and other interested departments. The UN Secretariat employees do not have diplomatic immunity and have been arrested in the past. In such cases we have to keep in mind that the Soviets might retaliate against American citizens who do not have diplomatic immunity as we believe was the case in Professor Barghorn's arrest in 1964. While UN officials are hesitant about taking strong actions against Soviet Secretariat personnel, they have never raised any objections to actions that we have taken against them. These officials recognize that they have a common interest with the United States Government in seeing to it that the actions of Soviet Secretariat personnel do not discredit the UN, particularly in the United States.

We can and will continue to use persona non grata action against Soviet UN Secretariat employees when strong evidence of improper activities is presented to us. Ten Soviet UN Secretariat employees have been declared persona non grata in the past.

e. Commercial Representatíves

The Soviets now employ twenty-two persons of Soviet nationality at their New York-based trading company, seven at Aeroflot, and five at Intourist. Employees of these commercial agencies do not have diplomatic immunity. There are now two unaccredited representatives of American firms in Moscow, although they are not U.S. nationals. The U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement of 1966 calls for Pan-American World Airways and Aeroflot to maintain up to eight employees each in other's country, although the
agreement is not precise about their nationality. An American Express Company office in Moscow now has one American and several local employees. In addition to Amtorg, Intourist, and Aeroflot, the Soviets have requested the opening in New York of a Sovexportfilm office. That request has been under consideration by the Department for more than a year but no action has been taken.

We believe that these Soviet commercial offices do not represent a substantial threat to our security, although some of their employees have been identified as intelligence agents. In the case of Amtorg, which was formed as a New York state corporation in 1924, we have had to expel or arrest employees in the past. We intend to oppose any unjustified expansion in their size and are confident that we have the means to do so. Amtorg has been staffed by twenty-two employees since 1966 and has made no effort to inflate its staff comparable to the inflation in recent years of the Soviet Trade Mission in the United Kingdom. In permitting any expansion in these offices, we will be guided both by whether a real need exists for the expansion and by the desires of our own businessmen to expand or open up offices in Moscow. With Soviet-American trade increasing, larger numbers of American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, and continuing consideration of expanded air services, we expect that one or more of these offices will wish to expand its present staff in the years to come.
f. Soviet Shipping

We recognize that the more frequent visits of Soviet ships to American ports pose a security threat (there were 72 such visits during the January - November period of 1971). The Port Security Committee, an inter-agency organization with representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Transportation, the Justice Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, was set up in 1951 to counter this threat. The State Department will continue to work closely with the other members of the Committee in ensuring that the intelligence-collection potential of visiting Soviet ships and their crews is minimized.

g. Journalists

While we have never insisted on absolute parity in the number of journalists each country wishes to station in the other, we have maintained that an approximate balance is desirable. Last August, when we had difficulties obtaining Soviet visas for United States correspondents, we suggested to the Soviets the possibility that we might have to insist upon parity if the visas were not forthcoming. They were. There are now twenty-six Soviet journalists in the United States, of whom thirteen, resident in New York, are accredited to the United Nations, against twenty-one Americans in Moscow. Several American slots in Moscow remain unfilled at this time, however, either because of the Soviet refusal to permit a Bureau to function (Time Magazine) or because the parent American company does not wish to fill its Moscow position for the time being (CBS and ABC).

We believe that Soviet journalists, who do not have diplomatic immunity, do not present a major security threat, although some of them have been involved in intelligence activity in past years. We have no hard evidence of intelligence-collection activities against any of them at this time. We further believe that the present policy of maintaining an approximate balance is correct.
h. Exchange Programs

Although the U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreements have brought thousands of Soviet citizens to our country, including some who are believed to have connections with intelligence agencies, our assessment remains that the net effect of these programs is in our interest. In line with current United States Government policy, we intend to continue and, if possible, expand these programs, the value of which is evident in the wide level of interest and participation they have attracted among American cultural, scientific, technical, educational and professional groups. In any case, the Department's Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff, which maintains close liaison with the FBI, will continue to screen carefully all exchange visitors coming here from the USSR.

With respect to the particular category of exchange students and scholars, there are or will be thirty-four Soviets studying at thirteen American universities during the 1971-1972 academic year, against thirty-five Americans in the Soviet Union. As in the case of journalists, we believe that we derive a net advantage from this exchange including the less visible advantage we expect to gain as the Soviet students, well-acquainted with our country, achieve positions of responsibility in their society.

In 1956, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency established an Interagency Intelligence Advisory Group on Exchanges which, inter alia, reviews proposals for potential intelligence risks. The Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Commerce and other agencies are represented on the Group which examines exchange proposals as well as the bona fides of prospective exchange scholars to attempt to limit KGB participation and to minimize the inherent risks in the scientific/technical fields.
i. Overseas Intelligence Attacks Upon the United States

Over the years we have instituted a number of security programs designed to protect American officials from recruitment attempts and other such intelligence attacks from Soviet agencies. While we cannot claim complete success, we are confident that all Americans in sensitive positions abroad are aware of their potential attractiveness to the KGB or the GRU. Americans traveling to the Soviet Union who are members of the State Department, AID, or USIA, inform the Embassy in advance of their visits, which provides an opportunity to deter them from going if such action appears warranted.