FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

DATE: SEPTEMBER 28, 1971

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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By: Laurie Madsen
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The unremitted aggravation of Soviet intelligence operations in England over the past two decades was recently dramatized by the unprecedented expulsion of 105 Soviet officials from that country. The cumulative circumstances published by the British Government concerning these pernicious activities have a striking relevance to a similar situation developing in the United States over a comparable period.

The intelligence services of the Soviet Union have defined the United States as the "Number One Enemy," and this emphasis pervades all operations. Their intelligence appetite is both voracious and indiscriminate. Overall objectives include collection of all information concerning political, military, economic, scientific, and technical data which is available openly or procurable through covert assets. They also engage in the invention and dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the status of the United States in the world community. One of the highest priorities is the penetration of agencies of the United States Government with particular emphasis being placed on intelligence services such as the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

In the practical pursuit of intelligence data the basic communist cliche, "the ends justify the means," is evident. Operations are primarily ruled by expediency; questions of legality, public opinion, potential embarrassment, ethics, or morals receive little consideration. Neither are these efforts hampered by official indifference or lack of material resources in the form of funds or manpower. Elements of their intelligence services occupy cover positions in practically every arm and level of the state, at home or abroad.

Operations against the United States are carried out by both the KGB (Committee for State Security) and the GRU (Military Intelligence). The bases for these operations can be grouped as follows: legal establishments; temporary visitors; illegal operations; third-country operations; and recruitment abroad. These classifications are used for convenience and are not all inclusive; neither should this grouping imply an inflexibility in the Soviet approach.
The legal operations are controlled by intelligence officers in the United States occupying cover positions in diplomatic, commercial, or cultural delegations. They have a legal presence in the United States and in most cases enjoy diplomatic immunity. This category offers the most tangible evidence of the intensity of Soviet operations. The number of Soviet officials posted to the embassy in Washington, D. C., the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (UN), employed by the UN Secretariat and by various ancillary establishments such as Amtorg, Tass, etc., has more than doubled over the past ten years. (See Chart, Exhibit 1.) In September, 1961, 333 officials (including wives employed at the various establishments) were present. By September, 1971, this figure had risen to 707.

These officers have a primary mission to conduct intelligence operations and official duties involved in their cover positions, if required at all, are secondary and serve mainly to legitimate their cover.

Evidence of the aggressive and expansionist tendencies displayed by Soviet intelligence can be found in the currently developing Soviet Consulate-General in San Francisco. Originally, the number of officials to staff this office was estimated as "8 to 10." Although not yet operational, five officials are now assigned to this establishment. Two wives are also employed making a total of seven Soviets, comprising a skeleton staff. These officials are seeking living accommodations for 30 families and looking to the possibility of expanding this number.
An important phase of legal operations is concerned with the collection of intelligence information regularly available in an open society such as the United States from innumerable sources. One such source which is exploited extensively by both the KGB and GRU is the National Technical Information Service operated by the United States Department of Commerce in Springfield, Virginia. This service provides an extensive supply of technical and scientific reports which are unclassified but of extremely high intelligence interest. Documents of this type are openly obtained by Soviet officials and establishments by massive subscription, in the neighborhood of 9,000 per year.

Thousands of examples are available throughout the past 20 years to illustrate the intensity and aggressiveness of Soviet intelligence legal operations, which by any index have become progressively more concentrated. One measure is available in these statistics: Since 1950, 47 Soviet officials have been left the United States as a result of persona non grata action, expulsion, dismissal by and/or termination of accreditation to the United Nations and by informal request. Over the same period, 28 Soviets have been excluded from entry or reentry into the United States. The above actions were taken as a direct result of intelligence activities.

In addition to official representatives in the United States, hundreds of Soviet nationals enter this country annually as members of exchange groups, students at U.S. universities, commercial representatives, or as visitors. Such persons are in this country from a few days to several months.
As indicated, Soviet emphasis on the United States as a target is worldwide and intelligence recruitment approaches to Americans abroad have become fairly commonplace. The KGB is known to screen all Americans entering the Soviet Union and to evaluate each with respect to any factors which might encourage a favorable approach. Similarly, Soviets stationed in other countries throughout the world are assiduous in cultivating and evaluating all contacts with Americans for the same purpose.
The counterintelligence challenge posed by the operations of the Soviet Intelligence Services against the U. S. is a formidable one. Counterintelligence is charged with the detection, coverage, and neutralization of such operations. Under the restrictions necessarily imposed by a democratic form of government, this objective cannot be achieved by a massive indiscriminate application of resources directed to match each enemy effort. The only practical counteraction is the logical deployment of available resources made possible through constant evaluation and analysis. Soviet intelligence operations against the United States, broad and pervasive, and ever increasing in intensity, continually constrict any selective process and limit options for effective counteraction. This, in essence, represents the counterintelligence problem facing the United States, as well as any other Western democracy targeted by the Soviets.

In comparison to the problems of counterintelligence operations in the United States, the problems faced by the KGB, which has these responsibilities in the Soviet Union, form an interesting contrast. The aggressive nature of these KGB operations is notoriously familiar to all American officials who have been stationed in the Soviet Union. Obvious physical surveillance, often taking the form of harassment, is commonplace. Comprehensive coverage through microphone and telephone surveillances has been documented beyond dispute.

KGB provocations, compromises, and intelligence approaches against U. S. personnel have been initiated by the score, many with recorded success. In summary, the KGB at home operates under even less restraint than they do abroad. In the Soviet Union then, counterintelligence applies massive resources against an intelligence effort which is restricted to selective deployment of available resources. This situation represents the basic paradox in the intelligence orientation of the U. S. and the Soviet Union.

Any assessment of the Soviet intelligence threat against the U. S. would be incomplete without consideration of the threat posed by intelligence operations of the services of their satellite countries. These are represented mainly in the U. S. by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Operations by these services follow the pattern set by the Soviet Union. Though effectiveness may vary within this group, for the most part they share the Soviet concept of the United States as the "number one enemy" and lack of finesse is generally compensated by zeal. Growth in the legal representation of the satellite countries in the U. S. has roughly paralleled that of the Soviet Union. (See Chart, Exhibit II.) In September,
1961, 285 satellite officials (including working wives) were stationed in the U. S.; by September, 1971, this number had increased to 459.

Recent British action to restrain Soviet intelligence activities in that country was drastic and undoubtedly initiated by realization that the national interest had become imperiled or otherwise disadvantaged to an intolerable degree. A significant consideration in such a decision was the diminishing ability of British counterintelligence to cope with the increasing intelligence threat, using the limited resources available for such an effort.

To what degree national interests are impaired by hostile intelligence onslaughts and what measures are taken to restore the integrity of these interests are evaluations and decisions which are affected by many complex considerations. The counterintelligence problem, however vital, is but a single factor and is outlined here in this perspective.

A careful study of this problem may suggest remedies which can be applied with minimal disturbance to the desirable balances existing in related matters of national interest.
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<th>Officials</th>
<th>Working Wives</th>
<th>DEPENDENTS</th>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>178</td>
<td>393</td>
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**TOTAL:** 1364

**IN THE UNITED STATES**

**SEPT 27 1971**

**FOIA(b) 1 Federal Bureau of Investigations**

**FOIA(b) 6 Federal Bureau of Investigations**

**SLOW ENT OFFICIAL PERSONNEL**

**Does not include members of special delegations and other officials temporarily in the United States and not assigned to official establishments.**
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Dependents</th>
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Total: 2,471
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