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USIA CA-2005 April 12, 1956

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## JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

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INFOGUIDE: FURTHER GUIDANCE ON SOVIET ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN.

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### I. Frame of Reference for U.S. Information Policy

#### A. Public Position

The U.S. public position has been set forth by Secretary Dulles in a carefully considered statement made at his press conference on April 3. It should serve as the basic guideline for all official output.

#### B. General Objective

Whatever the Soviet motivation for the anti-Stalin campaign, it may in fact assume the full force of an irreversible trend which advances basic U.S. interests. Our own effort should be to encourage that to happen, without at the same time setting up, on our side, an irreversible trend toward accommodation of calculated Soviet objectives.

### II. Principles for U.S. Exploitation

#### A. Manner of Exploitation

1. Widespread dissemination of appropriate materials should continue to take advantage of existing propaganda opportunities, without at the same time engaging in wishful thinking. We should continue to maintain a calm, objective attitude and avoid the appearance of launching a massive U.S. propaganda campaign.

2. It is considered advantageous to rely, wherever and whenever possible, on foreign opinion and local communist confusion to achieve our immediate goals rather than to inject publicly evidences of wide-spread U.S. output.

3. The Department prefers that, except for the Secretary's statement of April 3, no original material specifically attributed to official

Drafted by: IOP/PL:AVBoerner/

P:PBurris:brv

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Transmission and

classification approved by:

IOP:OMStophens

Clearances:

State:P - Mr. Robinson McIlvaine (cleared in draft)

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U.S. sources be used for the time being to assess the motivation, implications, or U.S. attitudes toward, the anti-Stalin campaign.

4. The Department believes that original U.S. commentary should not endeavor to rewrite or rephrase the Secretary's own carefully prepared statement. If desired, however, such commentary could analyze, summarize, elucidate or compare non-official interpretations on an attributed basis, which is consistent with and advances the U.S. public position.

5. In pursuance of the possible approaches listed below, reliance should, therefore, be placed on the careful selection of news stories, editorials, and non-U.S.-government commentaries, all on an attributed basis.

B. Corollary Points of Reference

Keeping constantly in mind the guidelines of the Secretary's statement, USIA may find it desirable to keep alive certain hopes and aspirations, confusion and embarrassment, etc., by examining the following corollary points of reference (for varying application to audiences in different parts of the world.) If so, such action should be accomplished by use of attributed non-U.S.-official material (see paragraphs A.2-4 above.)

1. The contrast between Communism and the Democratic Way of Life

- (a) The wholesale tyranny ascribed to Stalin is the antithesis of democracy;
- (b) The truth of what we have said about the Soviet regime over the past generation has now been confirmed by the highest Soviet sources;
- (c) Even communist leaders admit that Soviet policies under Stalin involved "excessive costs";
- (d) The precipitate and cynical destruction of the Stalin myth shatters communist claims to "infallible" leaders who propagate an "infallible" doctrine.

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2. Discrediting Stalin does not Destroy Stalinism

- (a) Stalin's aims, as proclaimed in the past, were reiterated at the recent Party Congress by the present leadership;
- (b) Stalin's men, including many who now denounce him, are still high in the Communist Party hierarchy, and in fact they employ Stalinist methods even to accomplish the destruction of Stalin;
- (c) Only a few of Stalin's victims have been rehabilitated. There are others who suffered innocently.
- (d) And most importantly, Stalin's policies (collectivization, police state, domination of the satellites, incorporation of the Baltic States, control over foreign communist parties, international communist conspiracy, etc.) have not been abandoned, but rather reaffirmed.

3. Meanwhile we must keep our guard up

- (a) We have experienced many abrupt shifts in the Communist party line in the past (e.g., NEP, the Hitler-Stalin pact);
- (b) The party congress has reaffirmed Soviet intentions to maintain a high level of Soviet expenditures and the traditional emphasis on heavy industry;
- (c) We must therefore maintain a high level of defense against the possibility of a new turnabout;
- (d) The most certain way to insure that Soviet leaders do not again attempt aggressive actions is to confront them with the firm determination of the free world to resist, to increase its political cohesion and economic well-being, and to increase opportunities for peaceful democratic progress.

C. Regional Emphasis

Careful consideration should be given to tailoring U.S. output to various regional requirements. The following general objectives may be useful:

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1. To the USSR audience: To encourage evolutionary developments, including the extension of the principle of collective leadership and greater concern by the Soviet population to take advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign by seeking further political relaxation and the improvement in their economic status.
2. To the Satellite audiences: To strengthen the hope for peaceful change toward greater personal and national freedom, and if circumstances warrant to encourage the gradual development of specific pressures in this direction. We should where possible exploit confusion and dissension within the local Communist leadership as well as differences between the satellite regimes and Moscow; and if developments warrant, ~~XX~~ accelerate tendencies toward independent actions by satellite leaders.
3. To Free World countries: To point up the continuity of basic Soviet policies from Lenin to the present regime; to combat tendencies which would accord the Soviet Union and its leaders increasing respectability; to counter trends toward relaxation of vigilance in the face of decreased tensions between East and West; and, to discredit local Communist parties and to promote dissension within them. In the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa we should seek to avoid giving the appearance of rigidity in our foreign policy.
4. With respect to Yugoslavia: To encourage Tito to remain independent.
5. Far East: Supplementary guidance on the Far East is being prepared and will be transmitted ~~XX~~ ~~XXXX~~ as soon as possible.

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