



DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

2099

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

2099

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: CA-8285, April 20, 1956

SUBJECT: Policy Information Statement for USIA (FE-243)
"The Far East and the Soviet Anti-Stalin Campaign"TO: BANGKOK, CANBERRA, DJAKARTA, ENKUAOKA, HONG KONG, KOBE, KUALA LUMPUR,
MANILA, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, NAGOYA, PHNOM PENH, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE,
SEOUL, SINGAPORE, SYDNEY, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, WELLINGTON

The enclosed Policy Information Statement--forwarded to the Post for use as outlined in Foreign Service Circular No. 49, November 18, 1953--has been transmitted to USIA Washington by the Department of State. This Statement does not constitute direct instructions for the USIS staff in your country. USIA is responsible for the issuance of policy instructions to its field staffs.

DULIES

Enclosure:

Policy Information Statement
FE-243

USIA - 26



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY:

FE/P:JMHLindbeck:mtr 4/19/56

APPROVED BY:

P-Mr. Burris

CLEARANCES:
(in draft)

FE-Mr. Sebald

CA-Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Clough

P-Mr. Burris

DRF-Mr. Jacobson (in substance)

This Document Must Be Returned to
Central Files
M/R

511.00/4-2056

CS/W

S/S-CR

APR 20 1956 P.M.

511.00/4-2056

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

Policy Information Statement
For USIA FE-243

THE FAR EAST AND THE SOVIET ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN

Reference: USITO CA-205 Infoguide: "Further Guidance on Soviet Anti-Stalin Campaign", April 12, 1956.

BACKGROUND (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

The events of the Soviet 20th Congress have far-reaching implications for Far Eastern Communism, particularly as they relate to the role of Stalin and the "cult of personality", the possibility of a "peaceful transition to Socialism", the nature of the Communist Bloc, the unique role of Communist China in World Communism, and the analysis of the international forces aiding and opposing Communism in Asia. Thus far, Peiping alone among the Asian Communist centers has reacted with more than generalities to the pronouncements of the 20th Congress. It has indicated its approval of the Congress proceedings (documents to be translated and circulated for study throughout China) and has implied its determination that the Soviet reappraisal of Stalin will not affect the "cult of personality" surrounding Mao Tse-tung.

Asian delegates to the 20th Soviet Party Congress were Chu Teh, commonly regarded as 4th ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, Secretary General D. N. Aidit of the Indonesian Communist Party, Korean Communist Vice Premier and Vice Chairman of Korean Labor Party Choe Yong Gun, and Shigeo Shida of the Japanese Party, attending as a "guest". It is unlikely that the Asian delegates were apprised beforehand of the most striking development at the Congress -- Khrushchev's still secret report in closed session on the excesses and errors of Stalin. Indeed, at the opening of the Congress Chu Teh had read a message from Mao which included praise of Stalin, hailing the "firmness and invincibility of the Soviet Communist Party created by Lenin and reared by Stalin and his close comrades-in-arms."

Immediately upon Chu Teh's return to Peiping an extraordinary enlarged session of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party met on April 4 to discuss developments of the Soviet Party Congress. The special article which appeared on April 4 in the Jen Min Jih Pao reflected what was no doubt the dominant and urgent concern of the Politburo meeting -- the Khrushchev Report on Stalin. To date, Peiping has not reacted to any of the other major issues raised by the Congress.

The Jen Min Jih Pao article, entitled "On Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" left no doubt that Peiping did not intend the criticism of Stalin to apply to Mao. The article lists some of the "important mistakes" which Stalin made: he "carried the problem of eliminating counter-revolutionaries to excess, showed lack of necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-fascist war, failed to pay proper attention to the further development of

agriculture

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

agriculture and the material welfare of the peasantry, advocated certain erroneous lines in the international Communist movement, especially on the question of Yugoslavia." The implication of the article is that Mao saved the Chinese Party from Stalin's errors. While admitting the fallibility of Communist leaders and condemning the errors of "individual heroism" against which the Chinese Communist Party is alleged to have waged continuous struggle, the article does defend and reaffirm the important role of leaders in history. The assault on the cult of the individual, however, one day may be a useful weapon in the hands of Mao's enemies within the party if his position should weaken. But there is no evidence that his enemies are today powerful enough to use this weapon.

In Communist China, both within and without the Party, there is probably a great sense of relief that it is no longer necessary to deify the Russian foreigner, Stalin. There have been many indications that this aspect of the new order in China has never been popular. At the same time the Chinese probably will take pride in the enhancement of Mao's position. A sharp distinction should be made, however, between the effect of the campaign to expose Stalin on Communist parties and its effect on people in general. Its impact on the Chinese people probably will be minor and ephemeral. Among party members, however, there undoubtedly will be confusion for some time as to how much of Stalin's doctrines and works are to be accepted and how much rejected. Young and idealistic party members surely are shocked and will raise embarrassing questions - as they are reported to have done in Eastern Europe.

The Chinese Communist endorsement of the reversal of judgment on Stalin does have obvious implications. Stalin's works, previously praised by Mao as the "encyclopedia of Marxism-Leninism, the summation of the experience of World Communism for the past hundred years," will lose their present commanding canonical place and bring into question the judgment of Mao and others who supported Stalin on his lofty pinnacle. The disadvantages to the Chinese Communist leaders of the exposure and denigration of Stalin are not compensated by the advantages which may accrue to the Russians -- the repudiation of unpopular domestic and external policies of the USSR associated with Stalin. The rank and file of the Chinese party and the Chinese people did not suffer directly from the Stalin terror and were told by the Chinese Communists only that all which transpired under Stalin in Russia was great and noble; nor can Peiping retain its cover of Chinese nationalism and use Stalin's influence or actions to justify revision or repudiation of its own foreign policies. Peiping's problem in this situation is to explain how both the Russians and the Chinese Communist Party leadership could either have been so wrong or have deceived the Chinese people so long about the character of Stalin and the putative Stalinist paradise in the USSR. Peiping must feel that its veracity, judgment and independence of Russian influence and control are brought in question. The sensitivity of the Chinese politburo to this appears to be reflected in the defensive tone of the Jen Min Jih Pao article in its efforts to salvage some of Stalin's reputation and contributions.

Peiping, however,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

Peiping, however, may be expected to second Moscow's statements on Stalin with whatever modifications the Chinese situation may require. It probably will be moderate in its criticisms of Stalin because Mao is under less obligation than the Eastern European Communist leaders to "explain" his relation to Stalin or to rationalize his failure in the past to speak up against Soviet errors. In general, while the Chinese Communists have liquidated millions of people who they alleged were a danger to their power and policies, they have avoided certain Stalinist excesses of the Soviet collectivization period and in regard to party purges and have escaped direct involvement in Stalinist policies and disputes which engulfed most of the other national parties.

The Soviet reappraisal of Stalin almost certainly will not affect the cult of Maoism in Communist China or Mao's role in the Party which are too firmly founded to be shaken by events in the USSR. There may be an increasing trend hereafter, however, to equate Mao with Lenin rather than Stalin. This trend has already found re-enforcement in the recognition by Soviet spokesmen of the "uniqueness" of Mao's contributions to Communist principles and practices. For example, D. T. Shepilov, the editor of Pravda, has stated that Mao's methods constituted so "creative" and "masterful" an application of Marxism-Leninism as to be, from a dogmatic viewpoint, "almost tantamount to trampling under foot the principles of Marxism-Leninism."

Likewise, in the field of foreign policy it is unlikely that Peiping will go as far as Moscow in noting Stalinist errors. While it was deeply involved in some aspects of Soviet foreign policy (such as the Korean war), it was not involved directly in other phases of policy (such as the war against Germany). It is doubtful, for example, that Peiping will openly support Mikoyan in his criticism of some of the "shortcomings" of Stalinist foreign policy which have been liquidated by the New Soviet leaders, such as the establishment of Soviet bases in China (Port Arthur) and Sino-Soviet joint companies. The Chinese Communist position on the Soviet occupancy of Port Arthur has been firmly set forth by Chou En-lai and other Chinese Communist leaders as of inestimable value to Communist China and world peace in preventing the expansion of the Korean war. This judgment is unlikely to be reversed now. If the Soviets, as now appears to be within the realm of possibility, should admit the falsehood of the biological war propaganda, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists would support such a repudiation of a propaganda position to which they were so deeply committed during the Korean War. In any case, divergent interpretations of foreign policy issues which may emerge from the Soviet Anti-Stalin campaign without doubt will prove to be sorely embarrassing to the Chinese Communists who have so painstakingly endeavored to explain to their own people and the world the inevitable justness and virtual infallibility of the actions of the USSR in relation to themselves and other peoples.

Clearly, the 20th Party Congress was conscious of the importance of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Resolutions of the Congress and almost every Soviet speaker called for a strengthening of the alliance. The admission of Soviet errors in dealing with Communist China may have been a step to eliminate irritants and

suspicious

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Security Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)

suspensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship, re-enforced by the subsequent announcement on April 7 of new economic assistance to Peiping to help construct 55 new industrial projects, bringing to 211 the number of Soviet projects in China. Moreover, it was probably a matter of real importance to the Chinese Communists that the Soviet leaders reaffirmed their support for the Chinese Communist position in the Taiwan area. Zhukov, in particular, discussed and defended Chinese Communist claims to Taiwan.

In general, the Chinese Communists may benefit from the actions of the Soviet 20th Party Congress. Mao's place as a leading figure in the World Communist Movement may be enhanced by, a) his previous avoidance of those Stalinist policies now subject to criticism and repudiation, b) his early record of opposition to certain Stalinist policies and leaders in China, c) the remoteness of his relationship to Stalin, d) the 20th Congress proclamation of policies which harmonize with and support current Chinese Communist policies, e) reiteration of public Soviet support for Peiping's claims to Taiwan, f) public Soviet tribute to Mao's "unique" contributions to Marxism-Leninism, and g) Soviet emphasis on the importance of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

On the other hand, there also are some obvious difficulties which the actions of the 20th Congress have raised for the Far Eastern Communists. The April 4th article of the Jen Min Jih Pao shows real Chinese sensitivity to the reactions and ridicule of the outside world, both to the unfrocking of Stalin and to the revelation of errors, excesses and terror which have marred — even from a Communist viewpoint — the Communist movement and the Soviet system in the USSR for the past three decades. The correctness of all Communist "truth" and policies hereby is jeopardized. Nor have the Chinese Communists, compared to the Russians, given equal emphasis to the importance of "collective leadership." They are not prepared to reduce the carefully enlarged image of Mao as the great leader.

In North Korea there may be a move to tone down the "cult of personality" surrounding Kim Il-sung. The Pyongyang radio has refrained in the past few weeks from using its customary slogan — "Long Live Marshall Kim Il-sung, the Respected and Beloved Chief of the Korean People" — to open its home service transmissions. In North Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong has indicated that Ho Chi Minh, unlike Stalin the dictator, is beloved by all the people.

Outside Communist-ruled territories in the Far East the Soviet repudiation of Stalin probably will diminish fears of the New Soviet leadership. The de-idolization of Stalin should facilitate the current diplomatic offensives of both the Soviet Union and Communist China in Asia. Old errors and excesses can be written off as belonging to the Stalin era and the coexistence theme can be pressed with greater hope of acceptance. What better proof that the Soviet Union has changed than this painful smashing of a once cherished idol?

Information Policy Guidance

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

Information Policy Guidance (CONFIDENTIAL)

Within the context of the overall guidance on the Soviet Anti-Stalin Campaign and by use of appropriate sections of the above evaluation as background, emphasize, particularly with questions, quotations and attributed statements, the following implications of the Soviet Anti-Stalin movement for Chinese and Far Eastern Communists:

1. One of the least defensible and most vulnerable elements of the world Communist movement to Asia is the slavish subordination of Communist regimes and parties to the USSR as the leader of the "great Camp of Peace and Socialism".

a. Mao Tse-tung, like others, praised and emulated Stalin and the USSR irrespective of facts and actual situations.

b. Asian Communists are required to make constant shifts in line to justify and explain irresponsible actions and policies of the USSR and their own support of these policies. (Note inconsistencies between current and past positions of Chinese and Far Eastern Communist leaders on Stalin and Stalinist policies. Is "collective leadership" to be the new fashion for Asian Communist parties and regimes?)

c. Stalinist principles and policies are now admitted to have been not in the interests of the USSR, other Communist countries, and the peoples of the world; there is no greater assurance that the present policies of the new leadership in the USSR are framed to serve the interests of other nations — Communist or non-Communist.

2. The leaders of Chinese and Far Eastern Communist parties are no more infallible than Stalin — whose praise they all sang — and their domestic and external policies are just as evil and dangerous. They all are the product of totalitarian systems which perpetuate uncorrected errors and terrors, are undemocratic, are based on perversions and distortions of truth and facts, and rest on the irresponsible dictatorship of one man or a small group. The new leaders in the USSR have now admitted and exposed some of these aspects of a Communist regime.

(Security Classification)

Copy from the National Archives
Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State
1955-59 Central Decimal File
File: 511.00/4-2056