Today’s post was written by David Langbart, archivist in Research Services at the National Archives at College Park, MD.
In January 1942, shortly after the United States was thrust into World War II by the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent December 11 declaration of war by Germany, officials in the Department of State considered the issue of the U.S. attitude toward the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gas, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 1925. Concern with gas warfare arose, however, even before the U.S. entered the war. On November 15, 1941, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) completed and shared with the Department of State a report entitled “Japanese Use of Poison Gas in China.” MID’s major conclusion was that Japan would “undoubtedly” use such weapons “whenever or wherever it seems necessary or profitable . . . to do so.”
By 1941, the 1925 Geneva Protocol had been ratified or adhered to by 41 nations, including all the major powers except two. Japan had not become a party nor had the United States. The U.S. had signed the protocol, but the Senate had never ratified it even though it was presented to that body on January 12, 1926. (The U.S. finally became a party to the protocol in 1975.)
After World War II began in September 1939, the British, French, German, and Italian governments exchanged pledges to respect the provisions of the protocol as long as the terms were not violated by the opposing parties. As the conflict spread, the British inquired of other countries whether they were prepared to honor the terms of the Protocol on a reciprocal basis. By January 1942, Finland had agreed, but Japan, Hungary, and Rumania had yet to reply. In the Department of State, the question arose of the appropriate U.S. stance. To learn the attitude of the other U.S. government agencies with an interest in the subject, on January 12, 1942, the Department sent identical letters to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Director of Civilian Defense Fiorello LaGuardia. The letters provided the necessary background and closed with the following:
In view of the foregoing facts it might be desirable for this Government to indicate that it is prepared on a basis of reciprocity to observe the terms of the protocol in question. The Department would be pleased to be informed of your attitude in this matter.
The replies received by the Department reflected a stark divergence of opinion.
- Secretary Knox sent a one-sentence reply on January 14. That letter stated simply that “the attitude of the Navy Department is against the use of such gases in warfare.”
- LaGuardia’s successor at Civilian Defense wrote on January 19 that “this office agrees that it might be desirable for our Government to indicate that it is prepared, on a basis of reciprocity, to observe the terms of the protocol in question.” He then went on to add, however:
May I ask, however, that this should not prevent, delay or in any way restrict the acquisition and preparation of every form of gas or any method of warfare, in order to be ready to retaliate should the enemies of our Government violate and break the terms of the Protocol. In fact, I do not trust them and feel that every precaution should be taken to retaliate in the event of their disregard of the obligations set forth in the Protocol, which I now anticipate.
- Secretary Stimson’s response of February 18 differed in that he strongly opposed making a public statement. He explained his reasoning in the following letter. His unbridled opinion is in the note he wrote at the bottom of the letter: “I strongly believe that our most effective weapon on this subject at the present time is to keep our mouths tight shut”.
At this point, no further action took place as far as the United States making a pledge. In June 1942, however, President Franklin Roosevelt made a statement regarding U.S. action in case Japanese use of gas against China continued or if Japan used such weapons against the Allies. He made another statement in June 1943, that expanded the scope of the warning to all the Axis powers.
Sources: Military Intelligence Division Report I.B. 152-A, Japanese Use of Poison Gas in China, November 15, 1941, file 740.00116 Pacific War/1-1/2; Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Director of Civilian Defense, January 12, 1942, file 740.00116 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/468; Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, January 14, 1942, file 740.00116 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/470; Director of Civilian Defense to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1942, file 740.00116 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/470; Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, February 18, 1942, file 740.00116 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/476; 1940-44 Central Decimal File (NAID 302021), RG 59: General Records of the Department of State.